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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The uses of block cipher has become crucial in nowadays’ computing era as well as the 
information security. Information must be available only for authenticated and 
authorized users. However, flaws and weaknesses in the cryptosystem can breach the 
security of stored and transmitted information. A weak key in the key schedule is well-
known issues which may affect several round keys have same bits in common. Besides, 
information leaked from the implementation also affects the security of block ciphers. 
Based on the flaws and leakage, the adversary is able to assess the differential 
relationships in block cipher using differential cryptanalysis technique. Firstly, the 
existing differential cryptanalysis techniques have been evaluated. Secondly, based on 
the gaps that have to be filled in the existing differential cryptanalysis techniques, new 
frameworks of differential cryptanalysis techniques have been proposed and designed by 
using Pearson correlation coefficient, Hamming-weight leakage assumption and 
reference point. The Pearson correlation coefficient is used to determine the repeated 
differential properties in the key schedules. Meanwhile, reference point and Hamming-
weight leakage assumption are used to assess the security of the implementation of 
block ciphers against side-channel cube attack and differential fault analysis. Thirdly, all 
proposed frameworks have been assessed. The results show that the repeated differential 
properties are found for AES, PRESENT and Simeck key schedules. However, AES key 
schedule is definitely ideal to be adopted in the design for the future cryptographic 
algorithm. In addition, the newly designed frameworks for side-channel differential 
analysis techniques have been able to reduce the attack complexities for Simeck32/64, 
KATAN32 and KTANTAN32 compared to previous work. In conclusion, the proposed 
frameworks are effective in analyzing the security of block ciphers using differential 
cryptanalysis techniques. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
Penggunaan sifer blok menjadi penting dalam era pengkomputeran masa kini serta 
keselamatan maklumat. Maklumat mesti disediakan untuk pengguna yang telah disahkan 
dan dibenarkan sahaja. Walau bagaimanapun, kelemahan dan kesilapan dalam sistem 
kriptografi boleh menyebabkan maklumat yang disimpan dan dihantar adalah tidak 
selamat. Kunci lemah yang terdapat di dalam penjadualan kunci mungkin menyebabkan 
beberapa kunci mempunyai bit yang sama. Selain itu, kebocoran maklumat dari 
pelaksanaan juga boleh mempengaruhi kekuatan sifer blok. Berdasarkan kelemahan dan 
kebocoran dalam pelaksanaan, musuh dapat menilai hubungan pembezaan dalam sifer 
blok. Pertama, teknik analisa pembezaan yang sedia ada telah dinilai berdasarkan 
aplikasi ke atas sifer blok. Kedua, beberapa rangka kerja baru untuk teknik analisa 
pembeza telah dicadangkan dan direka dengan menggunakan pekali korelasi Pearson, 
tanggapan kebocoran nilai berat Hamming dan titik rujukan. Pekali korelasi Pearson 
digunakan untuk menentukan sifat-sifat pembeza yang berulang di dalam penjadualan 
kunci. Sementara itu, titik rujukan dan tanggapan kebocoran nilai berat Hamming 
digunakan untuk menilai keselamatan pelaksanaan sifer blok terhadap serangan kiub 
saluran sisi dan analisis pembeza kesalahan. Ketiganya, semua rangka kerja yang baru 
telah dinilai. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa sifat pembezaan berulang dijumpai untuk 
penjadualan kunci AES, PRESENT dan Simeck. Walau bagaimanapun, penjadualan kunci 
AES pastinya sesuai untuk digunakan dalam reka bentuk untuk algoritma kriptografi masa 
depan. Di samping itu, rangka kerja baru yang direka untuk teknik analisis pembezaan 
secara saluran sisi telah dapat mengurangkan kompleksiti serangan untuk Simeck32 / 64, 
KATAN32 dan KTANTAN32 berbanding kompleksiti bagi serangan sebelum ini. 
Kesimpulannya, rangka kerja baru yang direka di dalam tesis ini telah menilai 
keselamatan sifer blok dengan sangat efektif. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Computing technology is evolving too fast. Beginning with the first gigantic 
machine in 1950 - 1960’s, ten years later in 1970’s the first networked mainframe-based 
machine was developed (Davis, 1977). Within that period, data was processed and stored 
in large, heavy and expensive machines. From time to time, data or information can be 
stored in larger capacity of storage, transmitted and retrieved everywhere at any time by 
using small, light and less expensive devices without being connected to a fixed physical 
link (Chen et al, 2000). Nowadays, utilizing network connectivity and computing 
capabilities, enable objects, sensors and any items generate, exchange and consume data 
with minimal human intervention (Rose, 2015).  
Advances in information and computing technologies have caused many 
organizations to employ symmetric block ciphers to provide confidentiality, data integrity 
and authentication and verification (Menezes et al, 1997). U.S. National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) had initiated a call for the encryption primitives and 
finally in 1974, NIST had chosen LUCIFER as the successful candidate. LUCIFER was 
designed by IBM in 1971 (Feistel, 1973). After a year of collaboration between National 
Security Agency (NSA) and IBM, LUCIFER had been turned into Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) (NIST, 1977). However, after the specification of DES was announced 
publicly, NIST had received feedbacks regarding the length of secret key. The proposed 
key length was 128 bits however the one stated in the specification is only 56 bits which 
2 
 
can be considered broken by using brute force attack. DES had been studied intensively by 
the researcher for better understanding on the design and strength.  
In 1991, Biham and Shamir had analyzed the DES block cipher by using 
differential cryptanalysis which faster than brute force search (Biham and Shamir, 1993). 
A year later, in 1994, Matsui had introduced an attack called linear cryptanalysis that was 
applied on the DES block cipher (Matsui, 1994). Due to the security issues in DES, thus in 
1997 NIST had made a call for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (NIST, 1997). The 
search for AES started in 1997 until 2000. Rijndael family of block ciphers had been 
chosen by NIST as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001. AES was then 
included in ISO/IEC 18033-3 standard (NIST, 2001). Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) also known by its original proposed name, Rijndael was developed by Joan Daemen 
and Vincent Rijmen to avoid differential and linear cryptanalysis and submitted to NIST in 
1998 (Daemen and Rijmen, 1998). There are three variants of AES (based on the key size); 
AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 with 10, 12 and 14 rounds respectively. AES is designed 
by using substitution-permutation network (SPN) with four steps namely SubBytes 
(substitution), ShiftRows (shift), MixColumns (permutation) and AddRoundKey.   
There were several initiatives had been conducted to identify secure cryptographic 
algorithms such as NESSIE project from 2000 - 2003 (European Commission, 2000), 
CRYPTREC in May 2000 (The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication and The 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2003) and eSTREAM in 2004 - 2008 (EU 
CRYPT, 2005). When this thesis was being written, Malaysia is in its initial stage of 
organizing National Trusted Cryptographic Algorithm List (MySEAL) Project. The project 
was initiated by CyberSecurity, an agency under Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation (MOSTI). By 2020, the project is expected to have a list of cryptographic 
algorithms. However, the project will continue to accept the submission of cryptographic 
algorithms. The project aims to welcome and later promote new cryptographic algorithms 
